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Abstract—Achieving a successful energetic transition through
a smarter and greener electricity grid is a major goal for
the 21st century. It is assumed that such smart grids will
be characterized by bidirectional electricity flows coupled with
the use of small renewable generators and a proper efficient
information system. All these bricks might enable end users to
take part in the grid stability by injecting power, or by shaping
their consumption against financial compensation. In this paper,
we propose an algorithm that forms coalitions of agents, called
prosumers, that both produce and consume. It is designed to be
used by aggregators that aim at selling the aggregated surplus
of production of the prosumers they control. We rely on real
weather data sampled across stations of a given territory in order
to simulate realistic production and consumption patterns for
each prosumer. This approach enables us to capture geographical
correlations among the agents while preserving the diversity due
to different behaviors. As aggregators are bound to the grid
operator by a contract, they seek to maximize their offer while
minimizing their risk. The proposed graph based algorithm takes
the underlying correlation structure of the agents into account
and outputs coalitions with both high productivity and low
variability. We show then that the resulting diversified coalitions
are able to generate higher benefits on a constrained energy
market, and are more resilient to random failures of the agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Designing stable power systems is a classical engineering
challenge since blackouts can have catastrophic consequences.
One obvious condition for stability revolves around sustaining
at any time a power generation that meets the demand. If
one is larger than the other, the system deviates from its
synchronous state. If nothing is done to return to the synchro-
nized equilibrium, this can lead to catastrophic cascades of
failures [1] [2]. With traditional power plants based on fossil
energies, the production can be scheduled in order to sustain
the predicted consumption. Deviations from this schedule can
then be supported almost on real time by using fast response
power plants, interconnections with border countries, as well
as regulator entities. Even if most individual consumers may
not realize it, the electricity prices are not constant rates
and evolve with the production/consumption conditions on the
grid. It is often assumed that the granularity of these prices
is meant to increase in the future as a way to pass on the
production conditions on the end users [3]. The pricing of
electricity and the necessity for the grid operator to have
different emergency reserves lead to an economy setting for
electricity, where operations and various kind of contracts
are decided on a market [4]. Such a market environment
clearly necessitates communication in order to monitor and
obtain information from the grid as well as exchange between
participants. These kind of settings are already being used at
the transport level of current power grid with large renewable
plants in the production portfolio. Using electricity markets
appears thus as a way to manage the reliability of the whole
system, especially when the use of renewables is important.
The smart grid vision however goes further and revolu-
tionizes this top-down centralized architecture by assuming
that bidirectional power flows are allowed. This would change
completely the nature of the traditional grid since production
could be located down to the very end of the distribution
networks. Nodes that were simply pure loads yesterday could
behave tomorrow as generators or loads [5]. On the other
hand, the user of renewables in the production is continuously
growing, and is expected to become majority in a near future.
These plants completely rely on the presence and the intensity
of their respective resources (wind, sun, tiles...). Balancing
production and demand in such a scenario appears much
more challenging and it seems inevitable that the grid should
modernize its infrastructures to sustain this transition [4]. The
key to drive safely such a system is assumed to be information,
and more precisely, the capacity to measure, communicate, and
analyze data on real time.
In this paper, we focus on these "nodes" in the distribution
network that can produce and consume electricity. More
precisely, we consider a set of agents that own both renewable
distributed energy resources (DER) and electrical loads. The
production of an agent can be, of course, used to meet its
own demand, but in cases when it is over-producing, we
consider that it has the possibility to inject, against financial
compensation, its extra-production in the grid. Such an agent
model is known as a "prosumer" [6] (and will be called
accordingly in this paper). A key point of this work is to
merge the interests of the grid operator with the prosumers in
a single utility function. While the latter intend to maximize
their benefits with higher production contracts, the operator
primary concerns are related to the quality and stability of the
injections. The coalitions that we wish to form should thus be
both stable and productive. This compromise can be difficult to
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obtain in real situations, especially when renewable generation
and complex spatiotemporal correlation happen.
More precisely, in our model, any entity that wishes to sell
its production on some energy market has to estimate and
announce a production capacity for an upcoming period of
time. If a contract is bought, the entity commits to injecting
exactly, at any time of the contracted period, the announced
amount of power, under financial penalties if it fails. Since pro-
sumers use exclusively renewables, contracts come naturally
with some amount of risk due to the intermittent nature of most
renewables. Using storage as buffers in order to reduce risks
is a popular approach. Actually, a whole branch of the smart
grid literature is even studying the possibility to use electric
vehicles as moving storage capacities for stabilizing the grid.
Without storage and proper control, the over-producing state of
the agents, and thus the power they inject in the grid, might
be rather unstable. This is clearly unacceptable for the grid
operator that cannot ensure system stability if it has to deal
with numerous small unpredictable entities.
Forming coalitions/aggregations is an envisaged solution to
both the number of entities soliciting the operator, and their
high variability. Indeed, it has been argued that using a multi-
level aggregators architecture for the control could lead to
better performance on the communication side [7], since an ag-
gregator can be considered as a single node by the level above
it. On the other hand, it is well-known that diversification of
the assets is a way of minimizing risks when constructing
a portfolio. One thus expect a more stable and predictable
energy production for a coalition than for a single agent.
Nevertheless, all coalitions are obviously not equally stable
or productive, which means that special attention should be
paid to the aggregation step. Recall that prosumers have both a
consumption and a production component, each depending on
location and time, meaning that there are complex underlying
correlations between the agents. This is a central topic of the
present paper : given N prosumers, what coalitions should be
formed so that the compromise between expected production
and variability is optimized ?
We will see that the variability in the aggregated produc-
tions can be quantified to a certain extent by the correlation
among the agents forming the coalitions. Understanding the
correlation relationships among the agents can thus give an
indication about what coalitions to form and how much they
should sell. More precisely, we use a graph representation of
the correlation structure to gain insight about the expected
production to risk ratios of different coalitions. We build
a framework in which the system operator specifies both
the minimum production acceptable to enter the market and
restrain the amount of risk he is willing to take. We then
propose a graph heuristic that uses decorrelated cliques in
order to form diversified productive and stable coalitions, and
we compare the results with other formation strategies (see
section VII).
Rather than maximizing the profit of each agent in the grid
(prosumers and grid operator), our algorithm tries to form the
most productive coalitions given a maximum amount of risk
acceptable. In other words, it tries to maximize coalitions prof-
its without considering individual retributions to single agents
(a task often studied through game theory). Furthermore, the
pricing strategies for both the prosumer and the grid is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Because agents are susceptible to fail for diverse reasons,
the propensity of the system to undertake these failures is
critical [8]. We therefore investigate in this paper the resilience
of the coalitions when prosumers fail. Despite the fact that
losing agents is usually detrimental to the coalitions, we will
see that the coalitions formed with our algorithm tend to be
less impacted by random failures.
The paper is organized as follows, section II gives a brief
overview of the related literature, section III clarifies how
we generated realistic prosumer production traces based on
weather data. In section IV, we define most of the notations
and explain why correlation between prosumers is a quantity
of interest for our objective. Based on the conclusions of sec-
tion IV, we develop in section V a utility function quantifying
how much power a coalition can announce on the market
given an accepted risk level. We then develop, in section VI a
greedy optimization algorithm that uses decorrelated cliques as
inputs and improves their utility over a correlation-constrained
environment. Finally, section VII provides some results both
on performance of the method and resilience of the coalitions
formed.
II. RELATED WORK
As explained in the section above, allowing entities using
mainly renewables to inject power in the grid is a difficult
challenge. Indeed, on the contrary to fossil plants whose
production can be scheduled in advance to meet the expected
consumption, renewables by definition only produce when
the resource is present. Unfortunately, these moments do not
necessarily coincide with the consumption peak hours [9].
One possible solution consists in shifting some of the loads
towards high productivity periods. Demand side management
techniques implemented in the end users’ smart meters, can
mitigate the consumption peaks and wast less production [9]
[10]. Since end users tend to seek a maximum utility at a
minimum cost, dynamic pricing is believed to be a good way
to give incentives to them. By carefully scheduling the prices,
it is assumed that the load curve can be shaped to some extend.
Dynamic pricing is an interesting and useful tool, but it
has also some limitations. It is likely that dynamic pricing
will serve as a shaping mass tool while finer techniques
will be needed locally. A popular approach in this direction
consists in deploying storage devices in the network and using
them as electricity buffers. Basically these storages would be
charged when there is a surplus of production, and discharged
when the consumption exceeds the production. Although quite
simple, this idea causes numerous challenges when it comes
to its real implementation. As long as the system considered
remains small, a centralized control of these buffers could be
envisioned. However, for real large systems it is likely that
more sophisticated decentralized algorithms will be necessary.
In [11], the authors introduce a distributed energy management
system with a high use of renewables such that power is
scheduled in a distributed fashion. In [12] the optimal storage
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capacity problem is addressed. There is indeed an interesting
trade-off between the costs of the equipments and the expected
availability of power. The authors develop a framework that
enables them to exhibit a Pareto front of efficient solutions.
These are only a few possibilities for balancing production
and demand in the smart grid. Most of the time, these
techniques will be coupled with predictions of the upcoming
load curves and weather conditions. Combining all these
technologies enables aggregators to quantify their expected
production and the inherent risk that comes with it. The
optimization of expected returns to risk is a traditional goal
in finance, and a wide literature exists on this topic. It is
well-known for instance, that the more risk one is willing to
take, the higher his potential gains. On the contrary, when
investing exclusively on low risks assets, one should expect
relatively small gains. This trade-off is formalized in the
Markowitz’ portfolio theory [13]. More precisely, given a set
of assets for which we have some historic data of returns, the
objective is to find a linear combination of these assets (the
so-called portfolio) which maximizes the expected value while
minimizing the variance of the portfolio’s return. Markowitz’s
answer is a set of efficient portfolios that all optimize in some
sense this trade-off. If one is able to put a number on his risk
acceptance or on the target expected return, the corresponding
efficient portfolio is a priori the best option. One of the most
controversial assumptions in the portfolio theory is that returns
are jointly normally distributed (or, at least, that the returns
distribution is jointly elliptical). Some economist have pointed
out the fact that this assumption might not capture well the
reality of financial markets [14].
Nevertheless, one of the key point in the Markowitz theory
is to consider explicitly the correlation between the assets since
they impact directly the variances of the portfolios. Since the
work of [15], an interesting approach consists in computing a
distance metric based on the correlation coefficients in order
to organize the series in a correlation graph. Nodes represent
the series considered while the edges are weighted by the
metric. Because the metric can be computed for all pairs, these
graphs are complete and of little use as is. Historically, the
approach used by [15] was to compute a minimum spanning
tree as to obtain a hierarchical clustering of the series. Later
on, it was pointed out that, by definition, a spanning tree
could not capture the underlying clustering structure hidden in
the correlation graph. In this paper, we use another classical
filtering technique called -graph [16]. It consists in selecting
a threshold , and filtering out edges with smaller weights.
As we will see further in this paper, this approach has the
advantage of preserving clusters of correlated series.
III. GENERATING REALISTIC PROSUMER PATTERNS
An essential component of the smart grid is the smart meter
which makes the interface between the end user and the rest
of the system. Smart meters coupled with sensors measure
quantities of interest (like instantaneous consumption), receive
informations from the grid (electricity prices for instance), and
take actions accordingly (demand side management programs).
Smart meters are currently and gradually deployed, and will
probably provide interesting datasets to work on. Unfortu-
nately, at the time this paper was written, production and
consumption data for prosumers over a large region were not
yet available to our knowledge. Some interesting experiments
are nonetheless being conducted and data are progressively
made public [17].
In this paper, we use weather quantities like wind speed
or solar radiance as alternative data for generating realistic
production and consumption series. Fortunately, these kinds
of data are easier to find, and since the development of small
personal weather stations, their geographical granularity keeps
increasing. Since these quantities depend both on time and
location, we discretize time into slots and space into zones in
the following. A zone is simply a portion of the considered
region of study for which we sampled data. Therefore, if
prosumers i and j are positioned on the same zone, they are
exposed to the same weather. Adding some intra-zone noise
can easily be done though not considered in this paper.
More formally, we denote by Pi(t) the instantaneous extra-
production of agent i at time t :
Pi(t) = P
P
i (t)− PDi (t) (1)
Where PPi (t) represents the total production of agent i
at time t and PDi (t) its consumption at time t. In other
words, Pi(t) represents the instantaneous surplus of power that
agent i is willing to sell at time t. As explained above, since
large datasets containing this quantity over time are not yet
available, we simulated these traces by considering separately
PPi and P
D
i .
For a prosumer i, it is possible to write both quantities as a
sum over the distributed energy resources (DERi) and loads
(loadi) of i :
PPi (t) =
∑
k∈DERi
Pk(t) (2)
PDi (t) =
∑
k∈loadi
Pk(t) (3)
For simplicity, in this paper we only consider wind-turbines
(WT) and photovoltaic panels (PV) as possible DERs for the
agents (DERi = WTi ∪ PVi):
PDi (t) =
∑
k∈WTi
Pk(t) +
∑
k∈PVi
Pk(t) (4)
We denote by νi(t) and Ψi(t) the wind speed (in m.s−1)
and the solar radiance ( in W.m−2) at the location of agent i
and at time t, so that :
PPi (t) =
∑
k∈WTi
FWT (νi(t)) +
∑
k∈PVi
FPV (Ψi(t)) (5)
Where FWT (resp. FPV ) is the power curve for the wind-
turbines (resp. photovoltaic panels). We made here the implicit
assumption that all wind-turbines (resp. photovoltaic panels)
have the same power curve. The model can be easily extended
to multiple power curves accounting for different types of
generators. More details about power curves and their approx-
imations can be found in the appendix B and in [18]. The
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Figure 1: Process diagram
process for generating the Pi series is pictured in the first
block of the process diagram (see figure 1).
Note that a prosumer i is defined by his zone Zi as well
as the sets DERi and loadi. That is, a prosumer can be
configured to represent anything from a single wind-turbine
for instance (DERi = {WT0} and loadi = ∅) to a pure
load (DERi = ∅ and loadi = {L0}) through more complex
combinations. In practice, we use random configurations for
the agents.
In the rest of the paper, we use french weather data [19]
starting in January 2006 and ending in December 2012, with a
sampling frequency of three hours, and generate N timeseries
of extra-production over this date range.
IV. NOTATIONS
This section provides most of the notations and introduces
important concepts for the rest of the paper. As explained
in section III, we consider a set A = {a1, a2, ..., aN} of
N prosumers configured randomly, and for each agent, we
simulate its extra-production Pi(t), ∀i ∈ A from 2006 to
2012. Based on these historical values, our objective is now
to form groups of prosumers (the so-called coalitions) so that
the global power production resulting from the superposition
of individual’s extra-productions be both sufficiently high and
predictable. Let PS(t) =
∑
i∈S Pi(t) be the extra-production
of coalition S at time t.
Suppose now that coalition S has to suggest a production
value PCRCTS to enter the market. This means that, during
the time S is on the market, it will have to inject in the
grid exactly PCRCTS at any time t and will be rewarded
proportionally to this amount, with penalties if it deviates.
Obviously, the actual extra-production will not be constant
at this value and will oscillate due to intermittences in the
production and consumption. If S always produces more than
PCRCTS , it will never have to pay penalties, but it is losing
some gains since it could have announced a higher contract
value. If the production oscillates around PCRCTS , by using
batteries or demand side management techniques (see section
II), S could be able to maintain its production to the contract
value at any time. Nevertheless, if the oscillations are too
important compared to the available storage capacity, S will
probably break the contract and pay penalties. We can see
that there is a return over risk trade-off here, meaning that
coalitions should find the right balance between announcing
too low and losing some potential gains, and claiming too high
and paying penalties.
Let us illustrate the rest of the notations and concepts with a
simple example. We consider only two agents i and j such that
the distribution of their extra-production can be approximated
by normal distributions : Pi ∼ N (µi, σi) and Pj ∼ N (µj , σj).
This is only for explanation purposes as it is of course rather
unrealistic in real situations where the distributions are skewed.
Using simple statistics, we can write the distribution of the
coalition S = {i, j} as P{i,j} ∼ N (µij , σij), where :{
µij = µi + µj
σij =
√
σ2i + σ
2
j + ρijσiσj
(6)
ρij being the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between Pi and
Pj . If the coalition {i, j} proposes a contract value PCRCTS ,
all instants when {i, j} will produce less than PCRCTS is
critical. Indeed, in this kind of situations, {i, j} will either
have to discharge batteries to keep up with its contract, or
pay penalties to the grid. The probability that {i, j} is under-
producing compared to the contract : Pr[Pi,j ≤ PCRCT ] is
thus an important indicator of the coalition’s quality. A well-
known result for normal distributions is that the cumulative
distribution function can be written as :
Pr[Pij ≤ PCRCTS ] =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
PCRCTS − µij
σij
√
2
)]
(7)
where erf is the error function : erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt.
The contract a given coalition is willing to take depends
on its capacity to compensate for under-producing (using
batteries, backup generators...), and its risk acceptance. Se-
lecting the right contract value appears thus as an interesting
problem on its own that we plan to investigate in future
works. In order to keep the present paper in a reasonable
length, we simplify the contract value selection problem by
giving some responsibilities to a third party named the grid
operator. The role of the grid operator is to constrain the
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Figure 2: PCRCT?S depending on reliability parameter φ for
Gaussian distributions (see equation 8). Blue curve with tri-
angles stands for a coalition S with an expected production
of 5 units and a standard deviation of 0.5. Under a grid
policy of φ = 0.1, it is able to announce a contract value
of PCRCT?S = 4.36. The same coalition in term of expected
production (µ = 5), but with a higher variance (σ = 1.5,
cyan curve with circles) can only afford a smaller contract
value of PCRCT?S = 3.07. The red curve with diamonds
stands for a coalition with a higher expected production
(µ = 7), but with a very high unpredictability (σ = 5). For
low values of φ, this coalition is thus heavily penalized and
can only afford a contract of 0.59 units. Under grid policy
(φ = 0.1, PMIN = 2), this last coalition is thus not allowed
to enter the market (red dot below the horizontal dashed line).
market entry to coalitions able to propose both sufficiently high
and sufficiently credible contract values. More formally, let
φ ∈ [0, 1] be the reliability threshold fixed by the grid operator
as a maximum value for the probability of under-producing.
The highest contract value that a coalition can propose is thus
PCRCT?S such that Pr[Pij ≤ PCRCT?S ] = φ. In the Gaussian
example, it implies that coalition {i, j} is announcing :
PCRCT?S = µij −
√
2σijerf
−1(1− 2φ) (8)
This is the best contract value that the coalition S can
afford giving the stability policy φ of the grid operator. Figure
2 shows how PCRCT?S evolves according to the reliability
parameter φ. For illustration, the range of φ values is shown
from 0 to 1, but in practice, only small values of φ really
make sense : φ = 1 for instance means that coalitions
can announce absolutely anything since the probability of
producing less than any contract value is necessarily less than
one by trivial definition of a probability. As visible on figure
2, coalitions with high expected productions but presenting a
high unpredictability are penalized and can only afford small
contracts.
In order not to overload the market with unrealistically
small coalitions, the grid operator also specifies a lower bound
PMIN on the contract values. We thus characterized a valid
coalition as one satisfying the two conditions :
{
Pr[Pij ≤ PCRCTS ] ≤ φ
PCRCTS ≥ PMIN (9)
On figure 2, PMIN is fixed to 2 units for illustration
purpose. For φ = 0.1, only blue triangles and cyan circles
coalitions are valid while red diamonds coalition is not.
The Gaussian assumption of this small example is conve-
nient as it allows us to write PCRCT?S analytically. Never-
theless, such assumption is rather unrealistic in practice. In
the following, we keep the same framework but release this
Gaussian assumption unless the contrary is specified (see eq.
14). This assumption will indeed be convenient for computing
some parameter estimates.
V. UTILITY FUNCTION
In this section, we use the notions of contract values and
valid coalitions developed in section IV in order to design a
proper utility function. The contract basically indicates the rate
at which a coalition has to inject power in the grid. It seems
then natural that coalitions are remunerated proportionally to
their contract values gain(S) ∝ PCRCT?S . More precisely, if
λ is the unitary price rate for electricity, a coalition S injecting
PCRCT?S in the grid during a period [t0, tk] earns :
gain(S) =
∫ tk
t0
λPCRCT?S dt = P
CRCT?
S
∫ tk
t0
λdt (10)
(since PCRCT?S is supposed to be a constant rate over the
contracted period). Using gain(S) directly as a utility function
suffers a major drawback. It is indeed not a concave function of
the coalitions’ sizes, meaning that coalitions can grow as large
as the number of agents allows it, without any counterbalance
effects.
Such a model, that virtually allows infinitely large coalitions
and contract values, is in practice not realistic. There are
indeed costs (communication costs for instance) that increase
with the coalitions sizes. We take this observation into account
by rescaling the utility of a coalition S by its size in term of
number of agents (|S|):
U(S) =

1
|S|α
PCRCT?S
PMAX
, if S is valid,
0, if S is not valid
(11)
where parameter α controls to what extent the size of a
coalition impacts its utility, and PMAX is a normalizing factor.
PMAX can be seen as the maximum production which can be
injected in the grid.
Based on U , the marginal contribution of an agent i can be
expressed as δS(i) = U(S + {i}) − U(S). A coalition S has
thus an interest in adding an additional agent i if this marginal
contribution is positive :
δS(i) ≥ 0 ⇔ PCRCT?S+{i} ≥ PCRCT?S
( |S|+ 1
|S|
)α
(12)
If α is set to zero, agents are added as long as they
increase the contract value of the coalition. If α is greater
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Figure 3: Gaussian mean approximation. Subplot a shows
how the parameter α of the utility function should be chosen
in function of the mean desired size of the coalitions (see
equation 14). Subplot b displays the corresponding utility
functions for different values of α. Blue curve with diamonds
favors very small coalitions of 2 agents while the green one
with triangles favors 5 agents coalitions. Finally, the red curve
with squares has an optimal size of 15 agents.
than zero, additional agents have to increase the contract
value by some factor. The utility function with α is not
necessarily convenient, here we relate α to the mean sizes
of the coalitions N¯ . otherwise U(S) tends to form coalitions
of size approximately in the order of N¯ , then :
[
∂U
∂|S|
]
|S|=N¯
= 0 (13)
In order to get an estimator for α, we solve equation 13
in a Gaussian case (as in section IV). Furthermore, since
considering all the possible interactions between agents is
analytically intractable, we use here a mean approximation.
Any quantity x that varies over the agent set is thus simplified
in its mean value x¯. Solving equation 13 for α in these
conditions leads to:
α?
N¯
=
0.7σ¯(ρ¯− 1)erf−1(2φ− 1)
µ¯
√
N¯(ρ¯N¯ − ρ¯+ 1) + 1.4σ¯erf−1(2φ− 1)(ρ¯N¯ − ρ¯+ 1)
(14)
Figure 3 shows how α? and the utility function evolves
according to the mean size of the coalitions N¯ . These curves
are only valid in the simplified Gaussian example considered
here. Nonetheless, they will provide some guidance when
using real data.
As can be pointed out, the purpose of U is not to study
coalitions stability against player defection which could be
done through game theory, nor to redistribute the coalition’s
utility in terms of individual payoffs. But we aim to design U
as a measure of how good a given coalition is according to
our criteria. In other terms does a given coalitions has a good
production to risk ratio.
VI. COALITION FORMATION
Section IV explained how contract values for the coalitions
are computed, and in section V we related this quantity to the
utility and gains of a coalition. Since the computation time of
this quantity is not negligible, we derive in this section the
heuristic we used to form the coalitions structure.
A. Representing the correlation structure
As seen in section IV, the variance of the aggregated pro-
duction impacts directly the contract values, and depends on
the covariances between the agents productions. We argue here
that, by having some representation of the correlation structure
between the agents, the search landscape for high utility
coalitions could be reduced, such that good coalitions are more
likely to be found quickly. Usually, this correlation structure
is formalized with a covariance matrix or a correlation matrix
that contains all the correlation coefficients between the agents
: M = (ρij)∀i,j∈A2 . By using a metric to map this matrix in
a weighted adjacency matrix (see section II), it is possible to
obtain a graph representation of the correlation relationships
between the agents.
In the following, we use two opposite distance metrics for
this mapping : {
d1ij = 1− ρ2ij ,
d2ij = ρ
2
ij = 1− d1ij (15)
Clearly, d1 (resp. d2) maps two correlated series as close
points (resp. distant) while two uncorrelated series are distant
(resp. close). These metrics enable us to compute a corre-
lation graph G1 = (A, E1) and a "de-correlation" graph
G2 = (A, E2). For any i and j, the weight of the edge eij
is d1ij in G1 and d
2
ij in G2.
In both cases, we want to keep only the edges which weights
are located in the lower tail of the distance distributions. In
other words, we want to compute the -graphs of G1 and G2
such that only meaningful edges remain. Selecting the right
filter  is thus an important point since it affects the landscape
search for the coalition formation. Unfortunately, there seems
to be no clear consensus in the literature on how to select
such a threshold. We will see later in this section that cliques
in G2 are potential seeds for the coalitions. Since we want to
generate NCOAL coalitions, we need at least NCOAL cliques
of a given size to start. Besides, since we consider coalitions
as disjoint, the starting cliques should be non overlapping. We
thus select our optimal threshold for G2 as :
? = min∈[0,1] { s.t. |Θk(G2)| ≥ NCOAL} (16)
where G2 is the de-correlation graph G2 filtered by , and
Θk(G) is the set of non overlapping cliques of size k in a
given graph G. In other words we select ? as the smallest
threshold possible such that the filtered de-correlation graph
contains at least NCOAL non overlapping cliques of size k.
The existence of ? as defined in equation 16 is not guaranteed.
The users has indeed to provide consistent values of NCOAL
or k compared to the size of the agent population A.
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Figure 4: Histograms of utility values for coalitions of size
3. Red bars stands for cliques in the decorrelation graph, and
blue bars represents all the other possible triplets. As visible,
cliques tend to exhibit higher utilities than randomly selected
coalitions.
B. Cliques
In [16] the structural roles of weak and strong links on finan-
cial correlation graphs is investigated. The author shows that
strong links, accounting for strong correlation relationships,
are responsible for the clustering, while weak links provide
the connectivity between clusters. Indeed, if we consider three
items, say a, b, and c such that a and b are strongly correlated
and b and c are also strongly correlated, then it is likely that a
and c are also strongly correlated. It can be easily shown using
the cosine addition formula1, that if ρab > x and ρbc > x with
x > 0, then ρac > 2x2 − 1). Correlation graphs capture this
weak transitivity notion through clusters of correlated series.
Nevertheless de-correlation seems like a more complex
concept than correlation in the sense that there is not even
a partial notion of transitivity when it comes to it. Therefore,
the clustering coefficients of G1 is much higher than the one
of G2. This can be seen as another formulation of [16] on the
structural roles of weak and strong links on financial corre-
lation graphs. Strong links, accounting for strong correlation
relationships, are responsible for the clustering, while weak
links provide the connectivity between clusters. Searching for
clusters in G2 and hoping that this strategy will provide a nice
coalition structure of internally uncorrelated coalitions seems
thus pointless.
Consider now a clique in G2, which is a complete subgraph
of G2. This is indeed a structure of interest for our purpose.
Since there is a link for every pairs of nodes, we know,
by construction, that a clique has a mean correlation and a
maximum correlation less than .
Figure 4 shows the distributions of the utility values for
cliques of size 3 (triangles) in G
?
2 and for all the other possible
triplets of agents. It is clearly visible that cliques tend to
exhibit higher utilities because of their de-correlation prop-
erty. Choosing cliques in G
?
2 as coalitions seems therefore
1 cos(a+ b) = cos(a)cos(b)− sin(a)sin(b)
appealing. Nevertheless, the quality of the results seems to
decrease as the sizes of the cliques increase. Indeed, the larger
the desired cliques, the more dense G
?
2 becomes (see equation
16). There is a point where cliques results more from noisy
edges than true de-correlation, which decreases the quality of
the results.
Directly mapping cliques to coalitions by this de-correlation
oriented approach is thus not sufficient. It is indeed possible
that adding agents to these cliques has the combined effect
of increasing the expected production while decreasing its
stability. The question revolves around measuring the benefits
of this production surplus compared to the disadvantage of
having coalition with high volatility. This can be quantified
by the marginal benefit in equation 12.
C. Algorithm
The algorithm takes inputs from :
• The agents : historical series of available productions Pi,
• The grid operator : market entrance policy (PMIN , φ),
• The "user" : Number of desired coalitions NCOAL and
size of starting cliques k.
The first steps consists in computing the de-correlation
graph G2 as well as the optimal threshold ?. Cliques
of size k in G
?
2 are considered as coalition seeds. The
next step is a local greedy improvement over the landscape
represented by G
?
2 . Cliques add alternatively the node i
?
in their neighborhood that yields the best marginal benefit
MAXi∈N(clique)δclique(i) where N(clique) is the neighbor-
hood of a given clique. This addition occurs only if i? is not
already involved in another coalition, and if δclique(i?) ≥ 0,
meaning that utilities are increasing. The algorithm stops when
all nodes are distributed in a coalition or when the global utility
stops increasing. See the details in algorithm 1 in the appendix.
VII. RESULTS
The algorithm presented in the previous section is supposed
to generate a given number of coalitions that have good
utilities. As it comprises mainly of a greedy optimization based
on local improvements, there is no guarantee that the algorithm
finds the global optimum. Since there is, to our knowledge, no
state of the art algorithm that aggregates uncorrelated agents
in an optimum way (see section II for related problems), we
compare the results with :
• Random sampling of coalitions : Coalitions are formed
randomly without any other constraint that the desired
size. This enables us to have an idea about the distribu-
tions of utility values for coalitions of a given size.
• Random sampling of coalition structures : Coalition
structures are sampled randomly by shuffling and random
divisions of the agents. Algorithm 2 uses such a sampling
and returns the highest utility coalition structure sampled.
This algorithm will be refered to as "random" in the
following.
• Correlated : This is the complete opposite of our al-
gorithm. It uses the correlation graph G1 and performs
a community detection. The resulting coalitions have
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Figure 5: Utility of random coalitions depending on their size.
Blue dots show real mean utility values and the thick red curve
its smoothed version by applying a Savitzky-Golay filter. On
this plot the α parameter of the utility function was selected
according to equation 14 in order to favor 40 agents coalitions.
thus very high internal correlations. We thus expect this
algorithm to perform very bad compared to the others.
See algorithm 3.
Before running the algorithms, we need to calibrate the
utility function by choosing the value of the α parameter.
Recall that the purpose of this parameter is to take into account
some constraints on the coalition’s sizes if needed. In this
paper, neither the communication network nor the electrical
grid are explicitly considered. Thus, we do not have any
technical constraints on coalition sizes even if we designed the
utility such that these could be taken into account. We select
the desired size as being bN/NCOALc (where b.cmeans floor).
Figure 5 shows how the mean utility of a coalition evolves
with its size when the optimum size is set to 40 agents. Using
equation 14 to estimate α based on the mean quantities and
Gaussian approximations seems to give acceptable results for
the utility function behavior.
Figure 6 displays the evolution of the global utility and the
number of involved agents during the course of the greedy
algorithm 1. The transition from an invalid to a valid coalitions
is clearly visible on the blue diamond curve and occurs
between iteration 10 and 15. After this transition, coalition’s
utilities improve slowly up to a maximum point.
Figure 7 shows the coalitions formed with the considered
algorithms in the contract value / volatility space. The color
map in the background indicates regions where we expect high
utilities (red) and the ones where we expect very poor utility
values (blue). The bottom right corner, with high contract
values and low volatilities, is therefore the region where we
wish to form our coalitions. A single coalition is represented
by a marker and the color and shape of a marker indicates
by which algorithm the coalition has been formed. Besides,
the sizes of the coalitions are indicated on the markers, and
the marker size is also proportional to the coalition size. We
can see that the utility function results in approximatively
balanced coalitions. Small yellow markers indicates the gravity
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Figure 6: Evolution of the global utility U(CS) (blue diamond
curve, left axis) and the number of agents involved in the
coalitions (red circle curve, right axis) during the greedy
optimization of algorithm 1
centers of their respective coalition structures. The coalitions
of correlated agents (green squares) are clearly of poor quality
according to our criteria since they can only afford small
production contracts, and with a very high volatility.
On figure 7, the decorrelated coalitions (blue dots) are closer
to the bottom right corner indicating a much better quality in
term of productivity over volatility ratio. The black dotted line
indicates the mean values for the random coalitions sampling
technique. Each small dot stands for the mean position of
all sampled coalitions of this given size. Variances are not
indicated for readability, but are usually quite large since this
sampling only takes the size as a constraint. We can see that
as coalitions get larger, they tend to increase on average their
contract values, but at the price of a higher volatility.
On figure 7, the results of the random coalition structure
sampling are shown with the red ellipses that represent the
distribution of the gravity centers of the sampled structures.
Since the center of the ellipses stands for the mean and each
ellipse adds one standard deviation, more than 99% of the
sampled gravity centers are within the largest ellipse. The
small yellow dot below the ellipses indicates the gravity center
of our solution. It is thus visible that our greedy graph based
algorithm is able to find a quite good coalition structure in
terms of volatility and contract values.
A key point for the coalitions, besides stability and pro-
ductivity, is their resilience. The resilience of a system can
be roughly described as its ability to perform its tasks when
subject to failures of its components. Therefore, the notion
of resilience we will use in the following can be seen as the
ability of the coalition structures to inject stable power in the
grid when node failures occur. According to our model, the
grid operator specified two thresholds (PMIN and φ) such
that the power injected by every coalition is constrained :
PCRCTS ∈ [PMIN , PCRCT?S ]. As long as a coalition can
propose a contract value higher than PMIN , it is valid and
allowed to enter the energy market. We define the resilience
of a coalition S as the probability that S produces more than
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Figure 7: Coalitions formed in the (contract value, volatility)
space. The color map indicates qualities of portions of the
plane. The closer to red the better (high contract values with
small volatility). On the opposite, blue areas show poor quality
(small contract values with high volatility). Blue dots stand for
the decorrelated coalitions that we formed while green squares
show correlated coalitions. The smaller yellow markers stand
for the gravity centers of the coalition structures. The black
dotted line shows how contract values and volatility evolve
when the size of the coalitions increases (a subset of the points
are labeled by the size of the coalition they represent). Each
point is the average over 105 unconstrained draws of a random
coalition. As we can also draw random coalition structures,
we show the distribution of their gravity centers by the red
ellipses (center is the mean, and each ellipse corresponds to
one standard deviation). For instance in our algorithm the
utility function favors balanced coalitions. We also loosely
constrained the sizes of the coalitions in the utility function.
the PMIN threshold :
RS = Pr[PS >= PMIN ] = 1− Pr[PS < PMIN ] (17)
And we extend this measure to the coalition structures :
RCS =
∏
S∈CS
(
1− Pr[PS < PMIN ]
)
(18)
We consider that prosumers fail randomly, and we denote by
ψ ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of agents that failed. Figure 8 exhibits
how the resilience of the coalition structures evolves according
to ψ. On the top subplot, PMIN was voluntarily selected
relatively low such that the resiliences of the three structures
fit on the same figure. When the PMIN requirement increases,
the differences between the algorithms also increase as visible
on the bottom subplot of figure 8. The decorrelated coalitions
seem to achieve a more resilient production on the market in
the sense that they are able to sustain a higher fraction of node
failures.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied how aggregations of prosumers
could be authorized to sell their surplus of production to the
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Figure 8: Resilience of the coalition structures when nodes
fail randomly (see equation 18) for PMIN = 10MW (top
subplot) and PMIN = 80MW (bottom subplot)
grid operator. By relying on the past values of the agents, we
constrained the market entry to both sufficiently productive
and stable coalitions. The power that a coalition is able
to propose on the market is therefore related to production
and stability. As the correlations between the prosumers that
form these coalitions impact directly their volatilities, we
seek uncorrelated aggregations of agents. We used a graph
representation of the correlation relationships between the
agents as a reduced landscape for the coalition formation. A
greedy algorithm that starts with cliques of the "de-correlation"
graph of the agents and makes local improvements offers a
good compromise between speed and quality of the results.
We compare these results with random samplings, and an
opposite strategy that clusters correlated agents together. We
showed that the coalitions resulting from our algorithm are
able to provide more power to the grid with a lower volatility.
Because they tend to have globally a better production over
volatility ratios, these coalitions will tend to use less storage
and waste less energy than more unstable coalitions. We plan
to study these benefits for the control of the aggregations in
future works.
Because in real situations, agents are prone to failure,
resilience is also an important criterion for the quality of
the aggregations. We therefore studied how the coalitions are
able to remain on the market when their agents fail randomly
one by one. We showed that, in this situation, the coalitions
resulting from our algorithm better withstand losses of agents.
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APPENDIX
A. Algorithms
B. Net production series
Data were collected from [19] (similar data can be found
at [20] for the United States). The variables used in the
simulation are :
• Average wind speed (in m.s−1)
• Nebulosity (integer in [0, 8])
• Temperature (in degree Celsius)
1) Wind power curve: Power curves are functions that, for
a given type of generator, map some input quantity to the
output power produced. For wind-turbines and solar arrays
these functions are well studied and approximations have been
proposed [18] [21], [22]. For the wind turbines, the power
curve can be specified by 4 values :
• Cut-in-speed : The wind speed at which the turbine first
starts to rotate and generates power.
• Rated-output-power : The maximum power that the tur-
bine can generate.
Data: Pi series,
Grid policy (PMIN , φ),
Desired number of coalitions NCOAL,
size of starting cliques k
Result: CS = {S1, ..., SNCOAL}
Compute G
?
2 ;
Find the NCOAL cliques in G
?
2 ;
while U(CS) is improving do
for each clique do
Find i? ;
if δclique(i?) ≥ 0 then
clique← clique ∪ {i?} ;
end
if ∃j ∈ clique, s.t δclique(j) < 0 then
clique← clique− {j} ;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Local greedy optimization algorithm
Data: Agent set A,
Desired number of coalitions NCOAL,
Maximum number of iterations Loopmax
Result: CS = {S1, ..., SNCOAL}
N loop ← 0 ;
CS? ← ∅;
while N loop < Loopmax do
CS ← SelectRandomCS();
if U(CS) > U(CS?) then
CS? ← CS;
end
N loop ← N loop + 1;
end
return CS?
Algorithm 2: Random algorithm
Data: Pi series,
Desired number of coalitions NCOAL,
search step size β << 1
Result: CS = {S1, ..., SNCOAL}
← 1 ;
CS ← ∅;
while |CS| < NCOAL do
Compute G1 ;
CS ← computeClusters(G1);
if |CS| = NCOAL then
return CS;
end
else
← − β;
end
end
Algorithm 3: Correlated algorithm
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• Rated-output-speed : The wind speed at which the turbine
attains its rated output power.
• Cut-out-speed : The speed at which the turbine is turned
off as not to damage the rotor.
The most interesting part is the increase of output power
when the wind speed is in the cut-in-speed rated-output-speed
range. Even if sometimes a simple linear model is used, the
increase has been shown to be non linear and some more
complex exponential fit can be found in the literature [18].
2) Solar power curve: The input quantity desired for our
power curve model for solar arrays is a radiance in W.m−2,
which can be difficult to find in weather station available
data. As we mainly collected nebulosity series, we used the
Helios model described in [21], [22]. This model enabled us
to compute perfect (clear blue sky situation) solar radiances
at some specific locations on earth and at given timestamps.
As nebulosity is a measure of the sky cloudiness, we can use
the nebulosity series as degradation factors on the clear blue
sky model (see [21], [22] for more details) :
Ψreal(t) = Ψperfect(t)η(t)
η(t) = 1− 0.75
(
N(t)
8
)3.4 (19)
where Ψperfect(t) and Ψreal(t) are respectively the clear blue
sky and real radiances at time t, η(t) is the degradation factor
at time t, and N(t) is the nebulosity index at time t.
Once we have input data in the forms of radiances, we
compute the production of a solar array with the following
simplified power curve :
FPV (Ψreal(t)) = SPV Ψreal(t)ePV (20)
where SPV is the surface of the array, and ePV is its
efficiency. The very simple form of this power curve is due
to some simplifications in order not to overload the model.
For instance, it does not take into account angles and orienta-
tions degradations. These could be incorporated if needed by
changing the power curve in the simulations.
3) Consumption: Modeling electric consumption has al-
ready been widely tackled in the literature. Models can be
basically divided into two main categories : Top-down and
bottom-up approaches. Top-down techniques take aggregated
consumption data as inputs and try to estimate individual
consumption patterns while bottom-up methods use a fine
modeling of users consumptions as to obtain realistic aggre-
gated consumption curves. In this paper, we used a bottom-
up model since the end user, or relatively small aggregations
of end users, are in our interest. The main objective was
to capture both daily patterns and seasonal variations of
the consumptions. We assumed an additive model where the
consumption of an agent is the sum of a seasonal heating
term that depends on the outside temperature and an electronic
consumption term that only depends on the hour of the day.
By denoting τ(t) the outside temperature at timestamp t, we
can express the consumption PDi (t) of agent i at time t :
PDi (t) = Fheati (τ(t), t) + Feleci (t) (21)
where Fheati (τ(t), t) is the power curve that maps the tem-
perature to a heating consumption, and Feleci (t) computes the
consumption of agent i (other than heating) at a given hour
of the day. In the simulation, all agents have a desired inside
temperature Ti, supposed to be a constant for simplification.
By using thermodynamic laws Fheati (τ(t), t) can be approxi-
mated by :
Fheati (τ(t), t) =
Bi
Ri
[Ti − τ(t)] (22)
where Bi is the surface of thermal exchanges for agent i and
Ri is their thermal resistance.
We denote by Ωi the maximum consumption possible for
agent i, which is basically the sum of all its appliances powers.
We also denote by ωi(t) = {ωi(t0), ..., ωi(t24)} the vector of
the average fraction of Ωi used for each hour. We can therefore
write :
Feleci (t) = Ωi(ωi(t) + ) (23)
where  is a noise term. The vector ωi(t) enables us to
easily differentiate agent consumption behaviors. Business or
residential areas for instance can be easily distinguished with
this kind of model.
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